City of Orem v. Scott Ray Bishop : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
City of Orem v. Scott Ray Bishop : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott Ray Bishop; Pro Se.
D. Jacob Summers; Orem City Prosecutor; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, City of Orem v. Scott Ray Bishop, No. 20100962 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2632
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SCOTT RAY BISHOP, 
Defendant/Appellant 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
CASE No.-CA 20100962 
ON APPhAi. rROM JUDGMENT IN THE i OURlli DISIRICT COURT 
THE HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE, JR. PRESIDING 
SCOTT RAY BISHOP 
221 North 650 East 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Telephone: (801) 995-1531 
Pro Se 
D. JACOB SUMMERS (#12253) 
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR 
56 North State Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Email: djsummers@orem.org 
Telephone: (801) 229-7097 
Attorney for Appellee 
. .JSfSte. COURTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. ABSENT A TRANSCRIPT OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO SUCH 
FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, THE COURT MUST PRESUME THAT THE 
VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE 5 
II. WITNESSES MAY TESTIFY AS TO THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS AND 
PERCEPTIONS 7 
A. The trial court never ruled Corporal Rich unable to testify 8 
B. Lay witnesses may use a legal term, where testimony is factual 9 
III. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT HAD PROPER SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 13 
A. The Authority of the City Attorney to Prosecute Offenses Against the Laws of 
the State of Utah Can Not Be Seriously Questioned 14 
B. Standing Is a Question of Law 18 
CONCLUSION 20 
APPENDICES 26 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Ellis. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50480 (W.D. Pa. 2007) 
(Unpublished) 14, 15, 16 
United States v. Charpentier, 438 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1971) 17 
United States v. Shunk. 881 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1989) 16, 17 
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1998) 19 
STATE CASES 
Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40 2 
City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Toole City, 2010 UT 38.... 14 
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1(1972) 13 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 10 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App. 378 6, 14 
Jorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal.App.3d 155 (1981) 13 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 5 
Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 162 Cal.Rptr. 724 
(1980) 13 
Qrem City v. Longoria, 2008 UT App. 168, 186 P.3d 958 6, 14 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982) 12 
State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42 1 
State v.Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 8, 9, 10, 11 
State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App. 194, 163 P.3d 707 1 
State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 3 
State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Utah 2007) 19 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 7 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987) 13 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 8, 10 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 9 
State v. Mauchlev, 2003 UT 10 16, 17 
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 48 P.3d 93 7 
State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9 8 
State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 6, 14 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 6, 14 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) 1 
Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12 5 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147 5 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177 5 
STATUE AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 2 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928(2) 17 
n 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(72) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-601 passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-102(11) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 1 
Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) 6 
Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) 1 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 1 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 19 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 8 
Utah Rule of Evidence 701 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Bob Dylan, "Subterranean Homesick Blues" from Bringing It All Back 
Home 13 
Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in all the 
Wrong Places, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2239, 2248 (1999) 14, 15 
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AMULR 275, 293-96 (Winter, 1989) 16 
Wigmore on Evidence § 2072 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) 17 
in 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
First, Appellant challenges the trial court's findings that Appellant committed the 
offense of Speeding. Utah appellate courts review challenges to factual findings for clear 
error. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "Findings of fact. . . 
shall not be set aside [on appeal] unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." See also 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (setting forth marshaling requirement to challenge fact finding); 
State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App. 194 at f 7, 163 P.3d 707 (stating "a trial court's factual 
findings may be reversed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous".) 
Second, Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling allowing the prosecutions 
witness to use the terms: "Driver", "Vehicle", and "Speeding". Utah appellate courts 
"review a trial court's decision to admit or preclude evidence under an abuse of discretion 
standard." State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 16 at [^6; see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42 
at 119. 
Third, Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling denying the Appellant the 
opportunity to ask specific questions of a witness. The basis for the trial court's ruling 
was that such elicited testimony would be irrelevant. Utah appellate courts "review a trial 
court's decision to admit or preclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard." 
State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 16 at \6\ see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42 at ^ [9. 
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Fourth, the Appellant challenges the standing of Appellee to prosecute the offense 
of Speeding. "A standing determination is primarily a question of law, although there 
may be factual findings that bear on the issue. Therefore, we review the district court's 
legal determinations for correctness but review is factual determinations with some 
deference to its findings." Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40 at T| 14. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928(2) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(72) 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-601 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-102(11) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(8) 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 
Utah Rule of Evidence 701 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 27, 2010, Appellant received a citation for Speeding (30 in a 25), 41-
6a-601. (Court Docket). The Appellant entered a not guilty plea and set the matter for 
trial on October 26, 2010. (Id,) On October 26, 2010, both parties were present, before 
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the Honorable Judge Eyre, in the Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department. (Id) 
The single count of Speeding, a class C misdemeanor, was amended to an Infraction. 
(Id.) A bench trial was conducted. (Id.) The Appellee called one witness, Corporal 
Rich. (Id.) This witness was questioned by both parties. (Id.) The City rested. (Id.) 
The Appellant did not call any witnesses, nor did the Appellant present any evidence. 
(Id.) Both parties made closing arguments. (Id.) The Appellant was found guilty of the 
Infraction, and the court imposed a $90.00 fine. (Id.) This Appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On appeal from a trial court verdict, the appellate court construes the facts and 
draws all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55 at [^2, 82 P.3d 1106. The Appellant certified that no transcript would 
be required on appeal. (Certificate That Transcript is Not Required, dated December 6, 
2010.) As such, the only facts present before this Court are those that comprise the 
Minutes of the Bench Trial, Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment by the trial court. See 
Utah R. App. P. 11. Appellant includes a Statement of Facts, but does not include 
citations to the record. Therefore, those Appellant's Statement of Facts should not be 
considered on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant failed to marshal any evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
and establishing a flaw in the evidence. Moreover, absent a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such findings or conclusions, the Court must presume that the verdict was 
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supported by admissible and competent evidence. As such, the Court should deny the 
Appellant request to review the trial court's finding and verdict. 
Appellant wishes to assign special significance to the words "driver", "vehicle", 
and "speeding" and removing them from the realm of lay testimony. However, these 
words are clearly within the realm of personal observations and helpful to the clear 
understanding to what Corporal Rich observed on August 27, 2010. The mere use of a 
legally defined term does not call for a legal conclusion. Corporal Rich's testimony was 
factual, the Court should affirm the trial courts findings and ultimate verdict. 
The Utah legislature granted the City of Orem standing to prosecute the offense of 
Speeding, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-601, in the name of the State of Utah. Id The Utah 
legislature provided that "[a] person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent . . . any speed in excess of limits provided . . . is prima facie 
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful." Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6a-601(l)-(5). The City of Orem provided evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which established that the Appellant, violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-601. As 
such, the City properly prosecuted a criminal offense, which the courts have continually 
upheld as an Executive function and rooted in the Executive's constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. Therefore, the Court should reject Appellant's 
argument that the City of Orem did not have standing. 
The questions which the trial court denied, asked for a lay witness to make a legal 
conclusion regarding a question of law. This type of testimony is clearly outside the 
scope of a lay witness. As such, the Appellant was seeking the witness to make an 
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opinion on a question of law, a topic left solely to trial court's determination. Further, 
asking a lay witness questions interpreting U.S. Supreme Court case law and standards of 
justiciability would not elicit testimony establishing the probability of any fact 
establishing the elements of Speeding, 41-6a-601. Therefore, the Court should properly 
deny the Appellant's due process argument and affirm the trial courts findings and 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT A TRANSCRIPT OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO SUCH 
FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, THE COURT MUST PRESUME THAT 
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The Appellant is required to "first marshal all the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Utah County 
v. Butler, 2008 UT 12 at Tf 11 (quoting Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 
UT 94,1J21, 54 P.3d 1177). The Appellant "may not simply cite to the evidence which 
supports his or her position and hope to prevail." Id. (quoting Wayment v. Howard, 2006 
UT 56 at \ 9, 144 P.3d 1147) (emphasis added). In this case, the Appellant should have 
"construct[ed] the evidence supporting the adversary's position, then ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence." Id. (quoting Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42 at % 17, 164 P.3d 384) (internal quotations 
omitted). The failure to marshal evidence, submits the party to "the risk that the 
reviewing court will decline . . . to review the trial court's factual findings." Id. 
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However, the reviewing court has the discretion to "consider independently the whole 
record and determine if the decision below has adequate factual support." Id. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 11(e)(2). See Hatch v. Davis. 2004 UT App. 378 at ^47. It is the 
Appellant's duty and responsibility to perfect the record, "[n] either the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions 
of the transcript." Utah R. App. Rule 11(e)(2). See also, Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App. 
378 at Tj 47. Where the record is incomplete, the Court is "unable to review the evidence 
as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and 
competent evidence." Hatch, 2004 UT App. 378 at TJ 48. See also Orem City v. 
Longoria. 2008 UT App. 168, 186 P.3d 958; State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Here, the Appellant filed a Formal Docketing Statement on December 15, 2010. 
In this Docketing Statement, the Appellant proffered two (2) issues on appeal. The first 
issue states "Did the Plaintiff meet its burden of proof for every element of the alleged 
crime?" (Appellant's Docket Statement at \ 7(a)). The Appellant's description of the 
determinative law addressed the City's ability to prosecute a traffic offense pursuant to 
the general justiciability principles of standing and injury in fact. The Appellant's 
second issue on appeal is stated in the Docket Statement as, "Was the refusal to permit 
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me to attack the sufficiency of the complaint a denial of due process?" (Appellant's 
Docket Statement at ^ 7(b)). The Appellant never alleged any error or deficiency in the 
trial court's factual findings and ultimate verdict in his Docketing Statement. Further, 
the Appellant, on December 6, 2010, certified that "no transcript will be requested in the 
above entitled case." (Certificate that Transcript is Not Required). 
Now at the briefing stage, the Appellant asserts that trial court's findings are in 
error. The Appellant argues that "[t]he trial court failed to uphold Appellee's duty to 
provide evidence proving Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Appellant 
Brief a p. 18). The Appellant failed to marshal any evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, and establishing a flaw in the evidence. Moreover, absent a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such findings or conclusions, the Court must presume that the 
verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence. As such, the Court should 
deny the Appellant request to review the trial court's finding and verdict. 
II. WITNESSES MAY TESTIFY AS TO THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS AND 
PERCEPTIONS. 
A witness may only testify as to "those matters of which he or she has personal 
knowledge." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989) (Overruled in part, on 
different grounds by State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 48 P.3d 93.) Defendant alleges that 
"[t]he trial court should have stricken or vacated any testimony produced by Corporal 
Rich because the court ruled him unable to testify." {Appellant's Brief at p.ll .) 
However, the Defendant's argument is fatally flawed. Appellant provides no legal 
authority, beyond the mere allegation that the invocation of such words requires the Court 
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to strike Corporal Rich?s testimony. The courts do not place any talismanic powers to 
legally defined words. See State v.Brvant 965 P.2d 539, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State 
v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Utah 1993). Utah law provides that lay witness may 
testify to observations, perceptions, and opinions or inferences which are rationally based 
on the witness's perception. See Utah Rule of Evidence 602 and 701- While, Rule 704 
makes "it clear that questions which would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what 
result to reach are not permitted", the mere characterization of testimony as a legal 
conclusion, without more, does not exclude a lay witness's testimony. See State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Utah 1993). Specifically, a witness's casual use of a legal 
defined term does not rise to the level of a legal conclusion. State v.Bryant, 965 P.2d at 
548. Therefore, Corporal Rich's testimony, based on his personal observations, including 
his usage of the terms "driver", "vehicle", and "speeding", was properly admissible. 
A. The trial court never ruled Corporal Rich unable to testify. 
A witness may testify only to "matters of which he has personal knowledge." 
State v. Powell 2007 UT 9 at If 51. At no point in the trial, did Appellant object to the 
ability of Corporal Rich to testify to his personal observations, nor was there any 
objection to his personal knowledge regarding the events of August 27, 2010. The trial 
court never made any finding or ruling excluding Corporal Rich's testimony. The 
Appellant does not cite to any portion of the record, which provides that Corporal Rich's 
ability to testify was challenged, let alone any preservation of the issue for Corporal Rich 
to testify as a fact witness. Further, the Appellant failed to marshal evidence supporting 
the trial court's determination that Corporal Rich's testimony was casual and factual in 
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nature, and not calling for a legal conclusion. Moreover, the Appellant failed to provide a 
transcript allowing the Court to review the entire record. As such, the Court should 
presume the correctness of findings by trial court allowing Corporal Rich to use the terms 
"driver", "vehicle", and "speeding".1 
B. Lay witnesses may use a legal term, where testimony is factual. 
Corporal Rich's usage of the legal defined terms "driver", "vehicle", and 
"speeding" when responding to the questions regarding his observations on August 27, 
2010, do not amount to a legal conclusion. While "there is no bright line between 
permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal responses", 
the courts review whether or not the questions call for an opinion on whether certain facts 
met a legal definition. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d at 548. The Utah courts have held that 
"a witness may use a legal term, such as "conspiracy," where the testimony is "factual 
and not a legal conclusion." Id (quoting State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 493 n.8 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). As such, the usage of the terms "driver", "vehicle", and "speeding" in 
response to questioning regarding the officer's observations and actions do not rise to the 
level of testifying to a legal conclusion. 
In State v. Bryant, the court reviewed on appeal a defendant's conviction for 
aggravated robbery, among other convictions. 965 P.2d at 541. Defendant appealed his 
conviction, arguing that the victim's use of the words "who had robbed us" constituted 
plain error. Id. at 547. At trial the following testimony was elicited: 
1
 It should be noted, that the Defendant never objected at the trial court to the officer's use 
of the term "speeding" and now presents this for the first time on appeal. 
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Q: Did you tell Marcie who had done this to you? 
A: Not at that time. 
Q: Okay. What happened next? 
A: So the she called the police and then she [came] over to the office. 
Q: How long after you had called her did she arrive at the office? 
A: Oh, like two or three minutes at the most. 
Q: Did you have a conversation with her then? 
A: Yes. Then I told her who had done - - who had robbed us. 
Q: Who did you tell her had robbed you and sexually abused you and 
entered inappropriately upon your residence? 
A: Mr. Bryant. 
Id. at 547. {Emphasis in Original) The Bryant court recognized that the Utah Rules of 
Evidence limit the testimony of lay witnesses to "opinions and inference which are 
rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to the factfinder to clearly 
understand the witness's testimony or to detemiine a fact in issue." Id. However, the 
court noted that while Rule 704 "does not allow all opinions". Id (citing Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 
1355, 1362 (Utah 1993). This rule prevents "questions which would merely allow the 
witness to tell the jury what result to reach". IcL However, the court stated that "the mere 
semantic characterization of. . . testimony as a legal conclusion does not, without more, 
move the testimony outside the scope of this ultimate-issue rule." IcL at 548 (quoting 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362.) 
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In Bryant, the court looked at the testimony of the witness, to determine whether 
the prosecutor asked the questions seeking the witness to "opine as to whether the facts of 
[that] case met the legal definition of robbery". Bryant, 965 P.2d at 548. Ultimately the 
Bryant court held that the prosecutor did not ask for a legal opinion of whether the facts 
in that case constituted the offense of robbery, "nor may [the witness's] testimony 
reasonably be understood that way". Id. In so holding, the court held that a witness may 
use a legal term where the testimony is factual, and not making a legal conclusion. Id. 
As such, "the victim's casual use of the word, 'robbery', was factual, not legal. Thus the 
trial court did not err in allowing her testimony." Id 
Here, Corporal Rich's testimony include the usage of the terms "Driver"2, 
"Vehicle"3, and "Speeding"4. Appellant takes issue with the usage of these words, as they 
are defined by statute. However, Appellant's Statement of Facts provides that these terms 
used were in a "casual" and "factual" manner and not in manner opining on the ultimate 
issue. Appellant's Statement of Facts provides: 
Corporal Rich testified that, at approximately 5:15pm, a vehicle, described 
as an Acura SUV, travelling North on 400 East, approached his position, 
that he made a visual estimate of the vehicle's speed to be approximately 
10-15 miles per hour over the posted 25 mph limit, and checked the 
2
 Driver as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-102(11): "(a) "Driver" means any person 
who drives, or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in any location open to the 
general public for purposes of vehicular traffic, (b) In Part 4, Uniform Commercial 
Driver License Act, "driver" includes any person who is required to hold a CDL under 
Part 4 or federal law. 
3
 Vehicle as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(72): "Vehicle" means a device in, 
on, or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway, 
except devices used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks. 
4
 The elements of Speeding are listed in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-601. 
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vehicle's speed with the Lidar unit, which registered a speed of 40 mph, for 
a total of 15 mph over the speed limit. 
Corporal Rich testified that, in making the traffic stop, "the vehicle passed 
me; I pulled out of the driveway, turned on my overhead lights at which 
point the vehicle pulled over, and I made contact with the driver of the 
vehicle." Corporal Rich subsequently identified Appellant as the driver of 
the vehicle to which he was referring.... 
Corporal Rich testified that he then issued a citation to the driver for 
Speeding. 
{Appellant's Brief at p.3). From the Appellant's characterization of Corporal Rich's 
testimony, it should be clear that the testimony was "factual" and not calling for a legal 
conclusion. Corporal Rich merely described the events of August 27, 2010, stating he 
observed a vehicle, describing it as an Acura SUV travelling North on 400 East, stopping 
the vehicle and speaking with the driver. 
The Appellant's argument is similar to an argument made in the Roods opinion, 
where it was argued that testimony regarding the gestation period for humans was beyond 
the scope of a lay witness. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982). There, the 
appellant argued that "the mother's testimony with respect to gestation was reversible 
error [because] she did not possess sufficient medical expertise to give opinion on full-
term birth." Id The Roods court stated that, "[c]ertainly her estimation as to the period 
of gestation is both rationally based upon her own perception and helpful to a clear 
understanding of the length of term of her child." IdL The courts have further stated that 
"[sjimply because a question might be capable of scientific determination, helpful lay 
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testimony touching on the issue and based on personal observation does not become 
expert opinion." State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987).5 
The Appellant's argument fails. Appellant wishes to assign special significance to 
the words "driver", "vehicle", and "speeding" and removing them from the realm of lay 
testimony. The mere use of a legally defined term does not call for a legal conclusion. 
The testimony of Corporal Rich was factual, based on his personal observations. The 
Court should affirm the trial courts findings and ultimate verdict. 
II. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT HAD PROPER SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION. 
District Courts have "subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C 
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102(8). Utah Code authorizes city attorneys to "prosecute, under state law, infractions 
and misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of the municipality." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-928(2). The Utah legislature granted the City of Orem standing to prosecute 
the offense of Speeding, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-601, in the name of the State of Utah. 
Id. On August 27, 2010, the Appellant was cited for speeding, a class C misdemeanor, 
within the municipal boundaries of the City of Orem. The citation was filed in the Fourth 
District Court, Spanish Fork Department, and prosecuted by a city attorney from the City 
of Orem. Prior to the trial, the City of Orem amended the citation to an infraction. 
5
 This lay witness testimony rule is encapsulated in the simple lyric "You don't need a 
weatherman to know which way the wind blows." (Bob Dylan, "Subterranean Homesick 
Blues" from Bringing It All Back Home) (cited by Cobbs v. Grant, (1972) 8 Cal.3d229, 
236 [104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1]; see also Mavroudis v. Superior Court, (1980) 102 
Cal.App.3d 594, 605 [162 Cal.Rptr. 724].). Jorgensen v. Beach fN' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 
Cal.App.3d 155 (1981)). 
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"Standing is a question of law" which the Court reviews for correctness, 
"affording deference for factual determinations that bear upon the question of standing, 
but minimal deference to the district court's application of the facts to the law." City of 
Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Toole City, 2010 UT 38 at ^ 9. The ultimate 
issue of standing is a question of law, one which the court reviews, based upon the facts 
presented at trial. Here, the Appellant failed to provide a transcript. Where the record is 
incomplete, the Court is "unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore 
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence." Hatch, 
2004 UT App. 378 at ^ 48. See also Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Orem City v. 
Longoria. 2008 UT App. 168, 186 P.3d 958. 
A. The Authority of the City Attorney to Prosecute Offenses Against the 
Laws of the State of Utah Can Not Be Seriously Questioned. 
While the Appellant asserts the notion that to have standing in an Article III civil 
controversy, the plaintiff must have a concrete stake in the litigation and suffered an 
injury-in-fact, the Appellant fails to appreciate the distinctions between a civil 
controversy and a criminal case. See United States v. Ellis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50480 at p.2 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (Unpublished). Ultimately, the Appellant argues that the 
City lacked standing to initiate a prosecution. (Appellant's Brief at p. 13-18.) In short the 
if Appellant's argument is correct, then the vast majority of criminal prosecutions are not 
Article III 'cases' or 'controversies' and the executive branch lacks standing to initiate 
them. See Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
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Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in all the Wrong 
Places, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2239, 2248 (1999). "Of course, this is an absurd result." Id 
Such a reading of Article III, would essentially "prohibit the United States [and the 
State of Utah and local municipalities] from vindicating its sovereign interests in its own 
courts." Id. at 2249. In Ellis, the federal court was presented with a similar argument. 
Ellis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50480 at p.2. There, the court held that the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, "based on this court's Article III jurisdiction to hear the case and the 
United States Attorney for the Western District's standing to conduct the prosecution", 
"must be denied because it is based on indisputably meritless legal theory." Id There the 
court looked at the text of Article III, which provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . ~ to 
Controversies between two or more States; . . . between citizens of different 
States 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall 
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. 
U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2. In reviewing the language of Article III, the 
court stated that "[t]o state the obvious, the founding fathers clearly contemplated 
prosecution of federal crimes in the courts of the United States and drafted the scope of 
Article III to assure that the federal judiciary would have the authority to exercise 
jurisdiction over such cases." Id. 
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The Ellis court further recognized the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which 
"long ago gave officials acting under the Attorney General exclusive authority to control 
the resolution of all grand jury indictments charging federal crimes and permitted this 
authority to be exercised within each local district." Id at p. 3 (citing Harold J. Krent, 
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 
AMULR 275, 293-96 (Winter, 1989)). Ultimately, the court held that "[t]o suggest, as 
pro se defendant has implied, that the United States attorney needs an injury-in-fact or a 
personal stake in the outcome of the prosecution in order to exercise this core executive 
duty in addition to the constitutional authority granted by Article II is a proposition 
without any legislative, executive, or judicial support in the two-hundred and eighteen 
plus years that have passed since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789." Id at p.3. 
Here, the Appellant's argument is essentially that absent an "injury-in-fact" the 
City of Orem may not prosecute the charge of Speeding, under Utah law. Such argument 
is made without any support of legal precedent. Appellant relies on State v. Mauchley, 
2003 UT 10 and United States v. Shunk 881 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1989). Neither of these 
cases address the issue of whether or not the State of Utah or the United States need to 
provide proof an "injury-in-fact" to withstand a standing challenge. Rather these cases 
deal with the "corpus delicti" rule and the admission of a confession. 
The Appellant's reliance on these cases is misguided. The Appellant latches onto 
dicta, which provides: 
An analysis of every crime reveals three component parts - - (1) the 
occurrence of the specific kind of injury or loss (as in homicide, a dead 
person; in arson, a burnt house; in larceny, property missing), (2) 
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somebody's criminality as the source of the loss (in contracts, e.g., to an 
accident), and (3) the accused's identity as the doer of the crime. 
Shunk, 881 F.2d at 918-19 (citing Wigmore on Evidence § 2072 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
The court then went on to define corpus delicti to mean "extrinsic evidence must 
establish the commission of the crime by somebody, or in other words, that the crime has 
in fact been committed." Id at 919 (quoting United States v. Charpentier, 438 F.2d 721, 
725 n.2 (10th Cir. 1971)). The dicta provided in the cases, merely means, that the 
prosecution must present extrinsic evidence that the crime has been committed. See State 
v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10 at ^[16-17. In Mauchley, the court stated that "[f]or example, in 
a homicide case, the State must produce evidence that a person died and that the death 
was caused by a criminal act in order to establish that an injury or occurred by criminal 
means." Id at [^17. This language cannot be interpreted to mean that the State or City 
must suffer some palpable injury-in-fact, rather, it merely provides that to admit a 
confession under the Corpus Delicti rule the State has to meet an actus rea evidentiary 
threshold prior to the admission of such a confession. 
Ultimately, the Court should simply review existing statutory law. Utah Code 
authorizes city attorneys to "prosecute, under state law, infractions and misdemeanors 
occurring within the boundaries of the municipality." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928(2). 
The Utah legislature granted the City of Orem standing to prosecute the offense of 
Speeding, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-601, in the name of the State of Utah. Id The Utah 
legislature provided that "[a] person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent . . . any speed in excess of limits provided . . . is prima facie 
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evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful/' Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6a-601(l)-(5). The City of Orem provided evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which established that the Appellant, violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-601. As 
such, the City properly prosecuted a criminal offense, which the courts have continually 
upheld as an Executive function and rooted in the Executive's constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. Therefore, the Court should reject Appellant's 
argument that the City of Orem did not have standing. 
B. Standing Is a Question of Law. 
The trial court properly restricted Appellant's questioning to only relevant factual 
questions. While the Appellant did not provide a transcript nor marshal the evidence in 
regards to the trial courts evidentiary questions, such rulings were proper. Appellant 
alleges that he was denied his due process rights based on his inability to question the 
witness about the Appellee's standing. However, such questions called for legal 
conclusions and were irrelevant. Again, the Court does not have a complete record for 
which it can review the evidence as a whole. 
Assuming arguendo, that the Appellant's Factual Statement is sufficient to review 
this issue on appeal. The Appellant was allowed to present evidence that there was no 
accident, no injury to any person, and no loss. (Appellant's Brief at p.4.) Further, the 
trial court instructed the Appellant that he could make the legal argument, requiring 
injury, at the conclusion of the case. (Id. at p.4-5.) However, the trial court sustained the 
objection, on the grounds of relevancy, of whether the "ticket presents] a valid cause of 
action?" (kL at p.5.) Again, the trail court sustained an objection, on the grounds of 
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relevancy, the question of "Are you aware, Officer Rich, that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that for a valid cause of action to exist the injury alleged must be, for example, 
distinct and palpable and not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical. . . ?" (Id. at p.6.) 
Last, the trial court sustained an objection, on the grounds of relevancy and legal 
conclusion, the question "Does this ticket present a justiciable case or controversy?" (Id.) 
Evidence to be admissible must have the "tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable. . ." Utah Rule of Evidence 401. Asking a lay witness questions interpreting 
U.S. Supreme Court case law and standards of justiciability would not elicit testimony 
establishing the probability of any fact establishing the elements of Speeding, 41-6a-601. 
Moreover, the questions which the trial court denied, ask for a lay witness to make 
a legal conclusion regarding a question of law. This type of testimony is clearly outside 
the scope of a lay witness. Utah recognizes the distinction between a question of law and 
a question of fact. See Utah Code § 77-17-10.6 As such, the Appellant was seeking the 
witness to make an opinion on a question of law, a topic left solely to trial court's 
detennination. Therefore, the Court should properly deny the Appellant's due process 
argument and affirm the trial courts findings and verdict. 
6
 The legislature clearly states that in criminal trials, questions of law are to be 
determined by the court, questions of fact by the jury. Rule 704 bars opinion testimony 
that advances a legal conclusion. See State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 914 (Utah 2007). 
"[0]pinion testimony is not helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal 
conclusion." Davis, 155 P.3d at 914-15 (citing Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 
P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993); Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) ("[I]t would be a waste of time if witnesses or counsel should duplicate the judge's 
statement of the law, and it would intolerably confound the jury to have it stated 
differently.") 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted well within it discretion, making its rulings regarding the 
admissibility of evidence. Absent a transcript of all evidence relevant to such findings or 
conclusions, the Court must presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and 
competent evidence. The mere use of a legally defined term does not call for a legal 
conclusion and the usage by Corporal Rich was factual, the Court should affirm the trial 
courts findings and ultimate verdict. The Utah legislature granted the City of Orem 
standing to prosecute the offense of Speeding, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-601, in the name 
of the State of Utah. Therefore, the Court should reject Appellant's argument that the 
City of Orem did not have standing. The questions which the trial court denied, asked for 
a lay witness to make a legal conclusion regarding a question of law. This type of 
testimony is clearly outside the scope of a lay witness. Therefore, the Court should 
properly deny the Appellant's due process argument and affirm the trial courts findings 
and verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~+ day of March, 2011. 
Br-JACOB SUMMER 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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APPENDICES 
U.S. Const Art III, Sec. 2 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority;-to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party;~to controversies between two or more states;--between 
a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between 
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a 
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which 
a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other 
cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to 
law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial 
shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not 
committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may 
by law have directed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 
Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor. 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney: 
(1) may prosecute violations of city ordinances: 
(2) may prosecute, under state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring within the 
boundaries of the municipality; 
(3) has the same powers in respect to violations as are exercised by a county attorney 
or district attorney, except that a city attorney's authority to grant immunity shall be 
limited to: 
(a) granting transactional immunity for violations of city ordinances; and 
(b) granting transactional immunity under state law for infractions and misdemeanors 
occurring within the boundaries of the municipality; 
(4) shall represent the interests of the state or the municipality in the appeal of any 
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matter prosecuted in any trial court by the city attorney; and 
(5) may cooperate with the Office of the Attorney General during investigations, 
including those described in Subsection 67-5-18(3)(f). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(72) 
"Vehicle" means a device in, on, or by which a person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn on a highway, except devices used exclusively on stationary rails or 
tracks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-601 
Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at certain locations — Prima facie 
speed limits — Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or 
highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603, the 
following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 41-6a-303; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603 is prima 
facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the speed 
limits on the highways of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 53-3-102(11) 
(11) (a) "Driver" means any person who drives, or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle in any location open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic. 
(b) In Part 4, Uniform Commercial Driver License Act, "driver" includes any person 
who is required to hold a CDL under Part 4 or federal law. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 
Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact 
by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as well as fact 
but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
Utah Code Ann, g 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is 
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript. 
Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
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shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
Definition of "relevant evidence.ff 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 
Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal 
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject 
to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 701 
Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. PATRICK DAVID ELLIS 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50480 
July 12, 2007, Decided 
July 12,2007, Filed 
COUNSEL: [*1] PATRICK DAVID ELLIS (1), 
Defendant, Pro se, Pittsburgh, PA. 
For PATRICK DAVID ELLIS (1), Defendant: W. 
Perm Hackney, LEAD ATTORNEY, Federal Public 
Defender's Office, Pittsburgh, PA. 
For USA, Plaintiff: Charles A. Eberle, LEAD 
ATTORNEY, United States Attorney's Office, 
Pittsburgh, PA. 
JUDGES: David Stewart Cercone, United States 
District Judge. 
OPINION BY: David Stewart Cercone 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
AND NOW, this 12<th> day of July, 2007, 
upon due consideration of pro se defendant's 
motion requesting appointment of paralegal and 
private investigator, IT IS ORDERED that the 
motion [46] be, and the same hereby is, denied to 
the extent defendant seeks such assistance to 
present a motion to dismiss challenging this court's 
2 
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Article III jurisdiction to hear the case and the 
United States Attorney for the Western District's 
"standing" to conduct the prosecution against him 
and denied without prejudice to renew with specific 
reasons why the requested services are necessary to 
an adequate defense in all other aspects. 
Under the Criminal Justice Act at § 
3006A(e)(l), the court may provide investigative, 
expert, or other services to a person who is 
financially unable to obtain those services only 
where the services are "necessary [*2] for adequate 
representation." 75 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l). In any 
such request for services the defendant must set 
forth the specific reasons why the services are 
necessary for his defense, explain precisely how the 
services will be used to support the defendant's 
legal theories, and state why the work needed for 
the defendant's case cannot currently be performed. 
Christian v. United States 398 F.2d 517, 519 (10th 
Cir. 1968); United States v. Davis, 582 F.2d 947, 
951 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Goodwin, 770 
F.2d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Defendant's request before the court 
insufficiently describes why the services of a 
paralegal and private investigator are necessary to 
the presentation of an adequate defense. There is no 
explanation of how pro se defendant intends to use 
a paralegal and private investigator to support his 
defense beyond general statements about the need 
for case law research and documenting the scene of 
the alleged crime. The request also does not 
sufficiently explain why the work needed for an 
adequate defense cannot be performed through 
services already available given that the request 
expressly acknowledges that assistance with the 
locating case law has already [*3] been offered by 
stand-by-counsel and his office. 
Moreover, to the extent pro se defendant has 
requested and intends to request such services to aid 
him in presenting a motion to dismiss based on this 
court's Article III jurisdiction to hear the case and 
the United States Attorney for the Western District's 
"standing" to conduct the prosecution, the motion 
must be denied because it is based on indisputably 
meritless legal theory. Although pro se defendant 
has latched on to the notion that to have standing in 
an Article III civil controversy, the party bringing 
the action must have a concrete stake in the 
litigation and have suffered an injury-in-fact, he 
fails to appreciate the distinctions to be drawn 
between a criminal case and a civil controversy. 
And while the broad language appearing in some of 
the more recent Supreme Court opinions 
expounding on the limitations of Article III 
standing would appear at first brush to be 
irreconcilable with the traditional mechanics 
employed in conducting criminal prosecutions, 
dogmatically drawing a corollary conclusion that 
federal criminal prosecution is outside the 
jurisdictional reach of Article III is tantamount to 
the "absurd." See Edward Hartnett, [*4] The 
Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is 
Looking for Answers in all the Wrong Places, 97 
Mich.L.Rev. 2239 (1999) (to reason and conclude 
from the current status of the Court's Article III 
standing doctrine that "the vast majority of federal 
criminal prosecutions are not 'cases' or 
'controversies' and the United States lacks standing 
to initiate them [would,] ... [o]f course, [amount to] 
an absurd result."). Furthermore, while there are 
several approaches that might be employed to 
harmonize the seemingly inconsistent principles 
present in federal criminal prosecutions with the 
Court's current approach to defining the outer scope 
of private causes of action challenging the actions 
of government officials under Article III, we need 
not delve into that foray to discard the notion that 
defendant may not be prosecuted by the Justice 
Department for violation of federal law on the junk 
pile of needless intellectual exercises in futility. See 
id. (noting that "Article III cannot sensibly be read 
to prohibit the United States from vindicating its 
sovereign interests in its own courts" and 
summarizing the various scholarly approaches that 
have [*5] been used to reconcile federal criminal 
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prosecutions with the Court's current standing 
jurisprudence). We merely look to the text of 
Article III itself and the body of scholarly opinion 
on the topic to assure ourselves that the conclusion 
we have reached is the right one. 
The text of Article III provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States ... ~ to 
Controversies between two or more 
States; ... between citizens of different 
States .... 
* * * 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in 
Cases of Impeachment; shall be by 
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in 
the State where the said Crimes shall 
have been committed; but when not 
committed within any State, the Trial 
shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed. 
U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2. To state the 
obvious, the founding fathers clearly contemplated 
prosecution of federal crimes in the courts of the 
United States and drafted the scope of Article III to 
assure that the federal judiciary would have the 
authority to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. 
The prosecution of defendant for violation of the 
laws of the United [*6] States presents precisely 
the type of case falling within the scope of that 
constitutional authority. 
Moreover, lest there be any question about this 
court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over 
defendant's prosecution, one need only survey the 
vast array of authority conceding that "the term 
'cases' in Article III includes criminal prosecutions, 
while the term 'controversies' does not." Hartnett, 
The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is 
Looking for Answers in all the Wrong Places, 97 
Mich.L.Rev. at 2249 & n. 56 (collecting scholarly 
works in support). And while one can question the 
ramifications of this truism on the soundness of 
current Article III standing doctrine, that does not 
change the accepted principle the "[i]n criminal 
cases (and perhaps more generally in Article III 
'cases'), the judiciary is enforcing the sovereign's 
law rather than umpiring a preexisting dispute [and] 
[t]hus, criminal prosecutions demonstrate that, at 
least when exercising jurisdiction over the 'cases' 
enumerated in Article III, nothing in Article III 
limits the use of the federal judicial power to 
enforcement of the rights of individuals or prohibits 
[*7] the use of the federal judicial power to enforce 
the majoritarian sovereign will." Id. at 2251. 
Nor can the authority of the United States 
attorney to prosecute offenses against the laws of 
the United States be seriously questioned. Through 
the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress 
long ago gave officials acting under the authority of 
the Attorney General exclusive authority to control 
the resolution of all grand jury indictments charging 
federal crimes and permitted this authority to be 
exercised within each local district. See Harold J. 
Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law 
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 
AMULR 275, 293-96 (Winter, 1989). And the 
congressional directive to exercise this 
discretionary authority continues to this day and has 
a direct application to defendant's prosecution. See 
28 U.S.C. § 547(1) ("... each United States attorney, 
within his district, shall - (1) prosecute for all 
offenses against the United States..."); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 541(a) ("The President shall appoint, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a 
United States attorney for each judicial district."). 
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Of course, the exercise of such authority has 
long been recognized [*8] as a core executive 
function having firm constitutional footing. See 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S Ct. 
1649, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985) ("Finally, we 
recognize that an agency's refusal to institute 
proceedings shares to some extent the 
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the 
Executive Branch not to mdict-a decision which has 
long been regarded as the special province of the 
Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive 
who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'") (citing U.S. 
Const., Art. II, § 3); Community for Creative Non-
violence v. Pierce, 252 U.S. App. D.C. 37, 786F.2d 
1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that power to 
decide to investigate and to prosecute "lies at the 
core of the Executive's duty to see to the faithful 
execution of the laws".); United States v. Cox, 342 
F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir.) (opinion of Wisdom, J.) 
(finding that "[t]he prosecution of offenses against 
the United States is an executive function within the 
exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General . . ."), 
cert, denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 1767, 14 L. Ed. 
2d 700 (1965); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 
1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.) (holding that Executive's 
power to determine which cases will be prosecuted 
is rooted [*9] in Executive's constitutional duty to 
take care that laws of United States are faithfully 
executed), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 948, 96 S. Ct. 
3167, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1184 (1976). To suggest, as pro 
se defendant has implied, that the United States 
attorney needs an injury-in-fact or a personal stake 
in the outcome of the prosecution in order to 
exercise this core executive duty in addition to the 
constitutional authority granted by Article II is a 
proposition without any legislative, executive, or 
judicial support in the two-hundred and eighteen 
plus years that have passed since the passage of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. In fact, the uniform 
consensus is to the contrary. See Hartnett, The 
Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is 
Looking for Answers in all the Wrong Places, 97 
Mich.L.Rev. at 2251 ("In short, if—as all concede— 
the United States can prosecute crimes in the 
federal courts, then a 'case' within the meaning of 
Article III must include litigation that is based on 
nothing more than the 'harm to the common 
concern for obedience to law,' and the 'abstract . . . 
injury to the interest in seeing that the law is 
obeyed.'"). Given the long-standing congressional 
recognition [*10] of the United States attorney's 
constitutional obligation to prosecute offenses 
against the laws of the United States and the 
uniform scholarly acknowledgment that such 
Justice Department employees properly may do so 
pursuant to Article II's commitment to the executive 
branch to enforce the interest of the sovereign in 
seeking to vindicate the general public interest in 
compliance with the law, defendant's effort to 
utilize scarce Criminal Justice Act resources to 
mount a defense based on contrary principles 
properly is denied. 
David Stewart Cercone 
United States District Judge 
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